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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
The

state appeals the district court’s order granting

Aaron James Howard’s motion

t0

suppress evidence gathered in association With a trafﬁc stop.

Statement

Of The

In early

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

December of 2018, Trooper Seth Green

initiated a trafﬁc stop at

in Post Falls, Idaho, after observing a vehicle turn abruptly into a

signal.

(TL, p. 11, L. 6

—

p. 13, L. 1.1)

in

and stopped behind the vehicle.

also

began

t0

from Trooper Green

When

asked,

Howard

at

names,” and then activated his emergency
EX.

1,

00:22 — 00:58.2)

As he

pulled

female driver and a male passenger exited

contact with Trooper Green, she ignored

him and

Which they were parked, while the male passenger,

walk away. (TL,

Howard stopped when Trooper Green
directions

lights on, a

made eye

sped up toward the back 0f the house

Aaron Howard,

street

(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2-1 1;

behind the vehicle with his emergency

“very quickly” and, though the driver

driveway Without using a

Because Trooper Green did not know his precise location

he “did a quick 100p in the intersection to get the
lights

around midnight

p. 13, L.

12

— p.

14, L. 16; EX. 1,

00:54 — 01:25.)

called to him, while the female driver ignored repeated

to return to the vehicle. (Id.)

refused to provide the driver’s

name and made

claim that the driver was simply trying t0 use the bathroom. (TL,

p. 14, L.

17

— p.

the implausible

15, L. 2; EX. 1,

document titled “Transcripts — Appeal Volume 1.pdf.”
At the hearing on the motion to suppress at issue in this appeal, the parties stipulated t0 the
admission of a dash-cam recording of the trafﬁc stop as Exhibit 1. (TL, p. 9, L. 17 — p. 10, L. 7;
1

Citations t0 “Tr.” are to the

2

20 —

View the ﬁrst twenty minutes 0f that
recording, and the district court watched through the twenty—second minute. (Id.) The dash-cam
recording is in the record 0n appeal as a ﬁle named “18-2902 Tpr Green Video.mp4,” and will be
p. 19, L.

p. 21, L. 10.)

referred to herein as ‘EX. 1.”

They asked

the district court t0

01:33

—

03:58.)

explaining t0

for

For Trooper Green’s safety While he attempted

Howard

that

he was not under

arrest,

to locate the driver,

and

after

he placed Howard in handcuffs, searched him

weapons, removed a knife in Howard’s possession, and placed him in the back 0f his patrol

car.

As he was doing

(Id.)

driver.

(EX.

1,

—

02:55

so,

another ofﬁcer arrived 0n scene t0 assist in trying to locate the

snow around

ofﬁcers followed footprints in the

The

from the driveway

in

When

Though

home. (EX.

1,

asked

in the

standing in the

like the driver

the audio

is

somewhat

car, the

two

(Tn, p. 15, Ls. 3-12.)

initially

expected, but

back of the patrol car (EX.

snow

if

three 0r four houses

1,

06:06 — 06:30;

her aunt would

conﬁrm

difﬁcult to hear, she denied having

that, the

woman

aunt’s.

As Trooper Green was

out 0f

06:26 —

1,

responded that the aunt was not

22) and she was unable to identify the address 0f the house (EX.

1,

down

Tr., p. 15,

come

(EX.

06:38 — 06:43.) In addition, the door t0 the house was locked (TL,

having any identiﬁcation. (EX.

1,

and provided a confusing story regarding her

was standing outside of was her

the car, and stated that the house she

06:37.)

woman

Howard

which Trooper Green stopped the vehicle (EX.

The woman looked

(Id.)

the back of the house.

after placing

03:56 — 03:59), another ofﬁcer located a

presence.

back of the patrol

(Id.)

Approximately two minutes

Ls. 13-22).

in the

back door 0f the house, as Trooper Green

footprints did not stop at the

continued south.

Howard was secured

03:07.) After

1,

p. 15, Ls. 13-

07:30 — 08:03).

She denied

07:09 — 07:20.)
attempting to

conﬁrm

the

woman’s

identity, another

ofﬁcer

looked in the passenger side window 0f the vehicle Trooper Green stopped and observed a bag of
marijuana near the passenger’s
19; EX.

1,

08:44 — 09:39.)

seat,

Which he then reported

He made

t0

Trooper Green. (TL,

that observation approximately

ﬁve minutes

p. 16, Ls. 5-

after

Howard

was placed

in the

back 0f the patrol

(EX.

car.

observed the marijuana through the window.
After the

woman

gave several

car directly in front of Howard.

for his

the

false

(Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-19;

name, which Howard provided. (EX.
while.”

1,

11:45

(EX.

1,

—

provide

it

identiﬁcation.

(EX.

1,

—

13:01.)

which Trooper Green permitted him

herself as Breanna

1,

16:42

—

16:47.)

10:54

—

11:35.)

He asked Howard

Asked how long he had known
Trooper Green then asked

11:57.)

Howard with

obstruction if he did not

he already had probable cause t0 search the car and would ﬁnd her

11:57

charged with obstruction

—

11:53

again for the driver’s name, threatening t0 charge

that

1,

11:49.)

Howard

and noting

EX.

later also

names, Trooper Green brought her back to the patrol

(TL, p. 15, Ls. 13-25; EX.

woman, Howard responded, “a

Trooper Green

03:58, 08:44.)

1,

if

Howard asked

t0 d0.

he could brieﬂy talk t0 the woman,

if

Howard told

(Id.)

the

woman that he was

going t0 be

he did not provide the ofﬁcer her name, prompting her to identify

McColim. (EX.

1,

12:55

—

13:18; Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-22.)

Trooper Green asked again for Howard’s name, Which Howard provided, and for
identiﬁcation,

which Howard

reiterated that

Howard was

McColim

ran from him.

driveway,

Howard

When

stated

was

in his

back pocket.

(EX.

1,

stated that

1,

13:44

—

13:50.)

13:44.)

Asked Why Ms. McColim had pulled

he did not know. (EX.

1,

13:54

dispatch later returned information 0n Ms.

outstanding misdemeanor warrant. (TL, p. 16, Ls. 1-4; EX.

The ofﬁcers then searched

—

1,

—

He

then

Howard brieﬂy when Ms.

not in trouble, but that he had to detain

(EX.

13:35

into that

14:02.)

McColim, she was
18:39

—

arrested

0n an

19:15.)

the vehicle and recovered the marijuana that both 0f

them

observed through the Window; a purse that contained drug paraphernalia and a small amount of
heroin residue; a backpack that contained female clothing; and a backpack that contained male

clothing, a substance in a

bag

that

Trooper Green believed t0 be methamphetamine, and a

methamphetamine drug

(TL, p. 17, L. 6

pipe.

Green then placed Howard under
that

After

charging

(Tr., p. 18, L.

20:13

— 34:25) Trooper

12

— p.

19, L. 1.)

Trooper Green then

him With possession of methamphetamine, marijuana,

He

t0 locate

and

drug

then ﬁled a motion to suppress (R., pp. 28-29) and

in support (R., pp. 30-39), arguing that

Green attempted

1,

his right t0 a preliminary hearing (R., pp. 21-22), the state ﬁled an

paraphernalia (R., pp. 25-27).

memorandum

EX.

p. 21, Ls. 11-13.)

Howard waived

information

p. 18, L. 11;

searched him, and found a digital scale with drug residue

arrest,

he determined t0 be methamphetamine.

had the vehicle towed. (TL,

—

he was unlawfully detained while Trooper

and identify Ms. McColim

(R., pp. 32-36).3

Without identifying any

evidence in particular, he concluded that “the evidence recovered as a result must be suppressed.”

36 (citing

(R., p.

Wong Sun

V. U.S.,

alternative arguments. (R., pp. 56-68.)

3

Howard

also argued

suppressed.

below

(R., pp. 36-39.)

371 U.S. 471 (1963).)
First, the state

The

state

responded with three

argued that Howard was a mere passenger

that evidence in a separate matter, not at issue here, should

be

After he was charged by complaint in this matter, he posted bond

and was released 0n December 10, 2018. (R., p. 3.) Just four days later, he failed
status conference and the district court issued a bench warrant.
(R., p. 16.)

t0 appear for a

Though this
information is not independently reﬂected in the record, Howard represented below that law
enforcement thereafter received information that he was in a hotel room, arrested him 0n the
warrant, and recovered additional contraband giving rise to charges in a separate criminal case,

CR28-19-1032.
matter,
also

In the

(R., p. 31.)

Howard argued below

same motion

to suppress addressing the evidence in this

that the contraband underlying the charge in

be suppressed because the bench warrant that led

t0 the recovery

CR28—19-1032 should

0f that contraband was

on the assumption that there was probable cause in this matter, which, he argued, the
could not have found if it were t0 suppress the evidence that Howard was asking it
t0 suppress in this matter.
Though Howard’s motion and memorandum in
(R., pp. 36-39.)
support include only the case number for this matter, CR28-18-20043, in their captions (R., pp.

valid only

district court

28, 30), the district court apparently construed
matters.

(TL, p.

At

the hearing

on the motion(s)

5, Ls. 4-10), the parties

— p.

Howard

to suppress,

it

as

moving

stated that

it

t0 suppress evidence in

both

was addressing both motions

provided argument regarding the evidence in CR28-19-1032 (TL,

—

p. 53, L. 2), and the district court ruled on it, denying the
motion t0 suppress in CR28—19-1032 (T12, p. 59, Ls. 1-17). Howard’s motion to suppress in
CR28-19-1032 and the district court’s denial 0f that motion are not at issue in this appeal.

p. 34, L. 18

44, L. 21; p. 52, L. 5

in the car with

state

no reasonable expectation 0f privacy

in

its

contents.

(R., pp. 57-58.)

Second, the

argued that Howard was lawfully seized as part of the trafﬁc stop, the legitimacy of which

Howard never
McColim’s
detained,

contested, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the stop, including

ﬂight.

(R., pp. 58-63.) Finally, the state

argued

that,

no evidence should have been suppressed because:

even

if Howard

Ms.

was unlawfully

(1) after the ofﬁcers

observed

marijuana in the vehicle, the search of the car was justiﬁed by probable cause t0 believe

it

contained contraband, Which probable cause was Wholly independent of Howard’s detention; (2)

having found that evidence, the ofﬁcers had probable cause to arrest Howard which constituted

an intervening circumstance, dissipating the
in the vehicle

taint

would have been discovered

in

of any unlawful detention; and

(3) the

evidence

an inventory search prior to towing had

it

not

already been discovered. (R., pp. 63-67.)

After testimony from Trooper Green and argument from the parties, the district court
granted Howard’s motion.

evidence that

the patrol car.

It

held that

Howard was engaged

Howard was unlawfully

in criminal activity at the time

(Tr., p. 58, Ls. 1-19.)

The court then held

seized because there

was n0

he was placed in the back of

that the inevitable discovery doctrine

does not apply to the evidence found in the backpack because “there has been no evidence that

such backpack contained any contents that were identifying attributable to the defendant.” (TL,
p. 58, Ls.

20-25 (verbatim).)

It

was seized by Trooper Green
vehicle.” (R., p. 74.)

The

state

then suppressed “evidence gathered against the defendant after he

.

.

.

,

including but not limited t0 the backpack located in the

timely ﬁled a notice of appeal. (R., pp. 75-78.)

ISSUES
Did
Howard?
1.

2.

the district court err

Even

if

when

it

determined that Trooper Green unlawfully detained

Trooper Green unlawfully detained Howard, did the

suppressing any evidence?

district

court err

by

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District

A.

Court Erred

When It Determined That Trooper Green Unlawfullv Detained Howard

Introduction

When

Trooper Green

initiated a trafﬁc stop,

exited the vehicle and began t0

01:25.)

walk away.

(TL, p. 13, L. 12

While the driver ignored Trooper Green’s

Howard complied.

(Id.)

Both

both the driver and the passenger, Howard,

for ofﬁcer safety

and

—

EX.

p. 14, L. 16;

directions t0 stop

and return

in order t0 effectuate the

1,

00:54 —

t0 the vehicle,

purpose 0f the stop,

Trooper Green placed Howard in the back 0f his patrol car While he and another ofﬁcer
attempted t0 locate and identify the driver. (TL,

The

district court erred in

p. 14, L.

17

— p.

15, L. 2; EX.

holding that Trooper Green was required to

let

1,

01:33

—

03:58.)

Howard walk away

from the trafﬁc stop before the purpose 0f the stop was effectuated and While the safety 0f the
ofﬁcers attempting t0 effectuate the purpose of the stop was at

and brieﬂy detained Howard

to effectuate the

risk.

Trooper Green reasonably

purpose of the stop, for his

own

safety,

control the scene as he attempted t0 locate and identify the driver.

Howard was

about ﬁve minutes before ofﬁcers observed marijuana in the car (TL,

p. 16, Ls. 5-19;

8:44), providing

B.

Standard

“When

and

t0

detained only

EX.

1,

3:56,

an independent basis to further detain him.

Of Review

reviewing seizure issues,

unless they are clearly erroneous.

.

.

[this

[but]

Court] defer[s] t0 the

trial

court’s factual ﬁndings,

freely review[s], de novo, the trial court’s legal

determination 0f Whether or not an illegal seizure occurred.” State
247, 787 P.2d 231, 233 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

V.

Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245,

Trooper Green LawfullV Detained Howard As Part

C.

Of The Trafﬁc

And For Ofﬁcer

Stop

Sa_fety

“A

trafﬁc stop constitutes a seizure 0f the driver andpassengers 0f a vehicle and

therefore subject to Fourth

it is

Amendment

strictures,

but because

analogous t0 an investigative detention.” State

1164

(Ct.

the stop,

App. 201
it

may

(emphasis added).4

1)

no longer than

last

the seizure thus ends

been—completed.”

When

is

V.

it is

is

limited in scope and duration,

Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59, 266 P.3d 1161,

Because “addressing the infraction

is

the purpose 0f

necessary t0 effectuate that purpose.

Authority for

tasks tied t0 the trafﬁc infraction

are—or reasonably should have

389 P.3d 150, 153 (2016)

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608,

(internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Trooper Green
after

initiated a trafﬁc stop

of the vehicle in Which Howard was a passenger

observing the vehicle turn without using a signal. (TL,

p. 12, L.

14

—

p. 13, L. 1.)

never argued below that Trooper Green did not have reasonable suspicion t0

4

“The Fourth Amendment

t0 the

United States Constitution and Article

I,

initiate

Howard
a trafﬁc

Section 17 0f the

Idaho Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. The guarantees

under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution are substantially the same.”
State V. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 845, 186 P.3d 696, 701 (Ct.
t0 suppress cited Article

I,

App. 2008). While Howard’s motion

Section 17 (R., pp. 28-29), he did not argue in his

Support that the application of that provision should vary in any
Fourth

Amendment

(R., pp. 32-36).

Though he did suggest

way from

at the

Memorandum

in

the application 0f the

suppression hearing that the

Idaho Constitution was relevant, he did so only With respect t0 the motion t0 suppress in CR28-

19-1032—discussed supra, note 3—which is not at issue in this appeal. (TL, p. 35, L. 2 — p. 44,
L. 23.) He has therefore waived any argument based 0n the claim that Article I, Section 17
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment With respect t0 the motion t0 suppress at
issue in this appeal.
State V. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct. App.
appellant’s “suppression motion cited both the United States and
though
the
that
1996) (hold

E

Idaho constitutions, his argument t0 the

trial

court

was based upon

the Fourth

Amendment.

.

.

.

[h]e did not at any point argue that the Idaho constitution extended greater protection than that

afforded

by the

federal constitution,”

and had therefore waived the argument.

Instead,

stop.

he argued

that,

because he was a passenger, not the driver, “he was not suspected

0f committing a crime, [and] the Trooper lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion when he
seized him.”

(R., p. 33.)

That

is,

investigate the driver for failing t0

have been permitted

to

he argued that even

employ a turn

signal,

if

Trooper Green was permitted t0

because he was a passenger he should

The

simply walk away from the vehicle.

district court

adopted that View.

(T12, p. 58, Ls. 1-19.)

But

it is

error t0 conclude that

Howard could be

detained only if he

was suspected 0f

criminal conduct. “[T]rafﬁc stops are especially fraught with danger t0 police officers.” Arizona

V.

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ofﬁcers must be permitted to “routinely exercise unquestioned

danger,

situation.” Li. (internal quotation

.

.

at

is

marks omitted). “The same weighty

present regardless of Whether the occupant of the stopped car

331 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

is

T0 minimize

that

command of

the

interest in

ofﬁcer safety

.

a driver or passenger.” Li.

Despite the fact that reasonable

suspicion 0f a trafﬁc infraction does not provide reason t0 think that the passenger

is

engaged in

criminal conduct, “the risk of a Violent encounter in a trafﬁc-stop setting stems not from the

ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding Violation, but from the fact that evidence

0f a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.”

“The motivation 0f a passenger

omitted).

crime

.

.

.

is

t0

employ Violence

every bit as great as that 0f the driver[,]

.

.

.

Li.

(internal quotation

t0 prevent apprehension

.

marks

of such a

[and] as a practical matter, the

passengers are already stopped by Virtue of the stop of the vehicle, so the additional intrusion on
the passenger

omitted).

is

minimal.”

Li. at

331-32 (internal quotation marks,

citations,

and

alterations

For those reasons, a trafﬁc stop permits an ofﬁcer t0 detain both the “driver and
passengers,” which detention “ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of

the stop,”

which normally “ends When the police have n0 ﬁthher need

inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.” Li

communicates

the police and

move

about

containing a passenger

after

he 0r she

to a reasonable passenger that

is

at Will,”

is

at

333.

t0

control the scene, and

“[A] trafﬁc stop 0f a car

not free t0 terminate the encounter with

and an ofﬁcer Who makes a trafﬁc stop of a vehicle

not required t0 give that passenger “an opportunity to depart the scene

he exited the vehicle without ﬁrst ensuring

dangerous person t0 get behind her.”

Li.

at

that, in so

doing, she

was not permitting a

333-34. Because passengers, as well as drivers, are

detained in a trafﬁc stop, and because ofﬁcer safety concerns are implicated if passengers are

permitted to simply walk

purpose 0f the stop

is

away from an ongoing

effectuated.

EQ

at

trafﬁc stop, passengers

334 (holding

until the trafﬁc stop ended); Brendlin V. California,

move around

in

ways

that passenger

detained until the

was lawﬁllly detained

551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007)

reasonable for passengers to expect that a police ofﬁcer

investigation Will not let people

may be

at the

(“It is

scene 0f a crime,

also

arrest, 0r

that could jeopardize his safety”

and n0

“passenger would feel free t0 leave, 0r t0 terminate the personal encounter any other way,

without advance permission”); United States

V.

Sanders, 510 F.3d 788, 789-92 (8th Cir. 2007)

(holding that ofﬁcer safety concerns permitted ofﬁcer to prevent passenger in vehicle stopped for

a trafﬁc Violation from leaving the scene); Presley V. State, 227 So. 3d 95, 107 (Fla. 2017)

(same).

When

Trooper Green

initiated a detention t0 investigate the trafﬁc Violation,

seized until the purpose 0f the stop

was

effectuated.

The

fact that the driver did not

Howard was
submit to the

stop does not diminish, but exacerbates the safety concerns that permit an ofﬁcer t0 control the

10

scene and detain the passenger for the duration 0f even a routine trafﬁc stop.

When the

the vehicle did not submit to Trooper Green’s authority and left the scene, Trooper

driver of

Green and

another ofﬁcer were required t0 search for her, not knowing where she had gone, Whether there

were other individuals Who might

assist her in resisting

secured weapons in a nearby residence.
driver’s

name and providing an

Howard was

any detention, or Whether she had

uncooperative, refusing to provide the

implausible story about where she had gone.

01 :43; TL, p. 14, Ls. 17-21 (stating that

Howard told him

that the driver

bathroom”).) The proposition that Trooper Green was required t0

he could search for the driver,

after

let

(EX.

had just gone

01:00 —

1,

t0 “use the

Howard walk away

before

Which Howard could potentially secure a weapon from the

vehicle 0r a nearby residence, accost ofﬁcers While they searched for the driver, 0r

evidence from the vehicle, deprives Trooper Green 0f the “unquestioned
stituation” during a stop, Brendlin, 551 U.S. at

258

(internal quotation omitted),

remove

command of
and the

the

ability t0

“control the scene,” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, that are necessary t0 ensure ofﬁcer safety.

Howard was

properly detained both because the purpose of the stop had not been effectuated and

for the safety

Nor
the vehicle

of the ofﬁcers as they attempted t0 locate and identify the driver of the vehicle.

is it

relevant that the stop occurred in a private driveway, or that

when Trooper Green

pulled behind

former was an important consideration, though
Court notes

this

wasn’t

--

the vehicle

it.

it

no merit

any way relevant

to the

argument

to the question

that

district court

did not say Why.

was not stopped on

actually stopped at a private residence and draws

facts are in

The

some

Howard was

seemed

t0 think that the

(T12, p. 58, Ls.

10-13 (“The

the side 0f the freeway, but

distinction there.”).)

exiting

it

was

But neither 0f those

Whether the seizure was lawful. There

is

certainly

Trooper Green could not effectuate a stop to investigate the

Violation of a trafﬁc law merely because the trafﬁc law that

11

was

violated involved pulling into a

private driveway.

vehicle

was

Nor

are concerns about ofﬁcer safety in

in a private driveway.

from the stop

in a private

In fact, the contrary

any way alleviated by the

fact that the

Letting a passenger walk

is true.

away

driveway could permit the passenger to access weapons in the nearby

residence, putting ofﬁcers at risk.

Howard made no argument below
0f the detention, was in any
therefore

700,

way inappropriate,

waived any such argument.

704

(2017)

that the nature

of the detention, as opposed t0 the fact

or that the detention

that

appellate

court

evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.”

marijuana in the car (EX.

had independent grounds
V.

1,

Howard was

review

(internal

Nevertheless, the nature of the detention

circumstances discussed above.

facto arrest,

State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

(“We have long held

alterations omitted».

was a de

was

is

and has

396 P.3d

limited

the

to

quotation marks and

also reasonable under the

detained only ﬁve minutes before ofﬁcers observed

03:52, 08:45; Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-19), at which point they indisputably

t0 detain

him

t0 investigate the possession

0f the marijuana.

Em

James, 148 Idaho 574, 578, 225 P.3d 1169, 1173 (2010) (“Deputy Sterling, upon ﬁnding drugs

in the car,

had probable cause

detention, ofﬁcers

place

Howard

t0 arrest all

were attempting

t0 locate

of the occupants.”).

and identify the

986 P.2d 1030, 1033-35

Where ofﬁcer was “faced With a potentially dangerous
area in which

driver,

in handcuffs in the patrol car t0 control the scene

State V. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367-69,

two other

as yet unidentiﬁed persons

criminal activity,” and Where defendant

was

During

and

that brief period

of

was reasonable

t0

it

and ensure ofﬁcer
(Ct.

safety.

App. 1999) (holding

situation in an unfamiliar

E
that

and darkened

might be lurking 0r otherwise engaged in

initially

uncooperative, ofﬁcer

was

entitled t0

handcuff defendant and place him in the patrol car While the ofﬁcers searched the surrounding
area); State V. Parkinson,

135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an

12

ofﬁcer conducting a typical investigation after making a trafﬁc stop

may

ask the driver t0

sit

in

the ofﬁcer’s patrol car).

The

Howard was
Violation,

by concluding

district court erred

that

Trooper Green unlawfully detained Howard.

lawfully detained in association With Trooper Green’s investigation of the trafﬁc

and to ensure ofﬁcer safety when the driver of the vehicle refused

commands and

The detention was

the scene.

left

observed marijuana in the vehicle,
could investigate potential drug

at

brief, lasting

obey lawful

t0

only ﬁve minutes before ofﬁcers

Which point Howard was lawfully detained so

that ofﬁcers

activity.

II.

Even

A.

If Trooper

Green Unlawfullv Detained Howard, The
Any Evidence

District Court Erred

Suppressing

Introduction

Below, the

state

provided four reasons t0 conclude that

Howard was

suppression of evidence, even if he was initially unlawfully detained.

Howard
58.)

BV

failed t0 establish that

not entitled t0 the

argued that

First, the state

he had standing to object to the search of the vehicle.

(R., pp. 57-

Second, the state argued that the discovery of the evidence in the vehicle was entirely

unrelated t0 Howard’s detention.

Howard was

(R., pp. 66-67.)

That evidence was discovered not because

detained, but because the ofﬁcers observed marijuana in the vehicle,

provided probable cause to conduct a warrantless search.

(Id.)

Third, the state argued that

because the vehicle was towed and would have been subject t0 an inventory search
already been searched pursuant t0 probable cause, the evidence in the vehicle

have been discovered.
be suppressed because

(R., p. 67.)

it

which

if

would

it

had not

inevitably

Fourth, and ﬁnally, the state argued that the scale should not

was found

in a lawful search incident to arrest,

Which

arrest

justiﬁed by probable cause entirely independent 0f Howard’s allegedly unlawful seizure.

13

was

(Id.)

The

district court speciﬁcally

addressed only the methamphetamine and drug pipe located

in the backpack, holding that they should

be suppressed because “there has been n0 evidence that

such backpack contained any contents that were identifying
(TL, p. 58, Ls. 20-25.)

backpack had anything

It

t0

did not explain

how

[sic] attributable to

the absence 0f identifying information in the

d0 with Howard’s suppression motion.

It

also did not address the

marijuana found in the vehicle or the scale found 0n Howard’s person.
thereafter issued a broadly

after

worded order suppressing

he was seized by Trooper Green

.

.

.

,

the defendant.”

all

The

district court

“evidence gathered against the defendant

including but not limited t0 the backpack located in

the vehicle.” (R., p. 74.)

The

After ofﬁcers observed marijuana in the vehicle, the search 0f

district court erred.

the vehicle and

contraband.

contents

its

was justiﬁed by probable cause

The search had nothing

court appears

to

have thought

information, that fact

was
it

the evidence in the car

would

d0 With Howard’s detention.

it

contained

While the

district

relevant that the backpack did not contain identifying

irrelevant t0

eventually towed and, if

district court

it

at all t0

t0 believe that

Howard’s suppression motion. In

had not already been located

addition, the car

in a search justiﬁed

by probable

inevitably have been discovered in an inventory search.

was

cause,

The

provided n0 reason to suppress the marijuana found in the car and the scale found in

Howard’s pocket. As

to the scale,

it

was found

in a search incident t0 a lawful arrest pursuant t0

probable cause that was entirely independent 0f Howard’s seizure. Even
unlawfully detained

initially,

neither the

if

methamphetamine and drug pipe found

nor the scale found 0n Howard’s person should have been suppressed.

14

Howard was
in the vehicle,

Finally, but for those pieces

0f physical evidence, Howard failed t0 identify any evidence

that the district court allegedly should

order

B.

have suppressed.

To

the extent that the district court’s

intended t0 apply t0 any other evidence, the district court erred.

is

Standard

Of Review

This Court reviews a

district court’s

order resolving a motion t0 suppress “using a

bifurcated standard of review. This Court accepts the

clearly erroneous, but

in light

0f those

may

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact unless they are

freely review the trial court’s application

State V. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404,

facts.”

(internal citations omitted) (quoting State V. Wulff,

0f constitutional principles

374 P.3d 563, 567 (2016)

157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577

(2014)).

C.

Because The Search Of The Vehicle Was Justiﬁed BV Probable Cause And Was
Unrelated To Howard’s Detention, It Was Error T0 Suppress Any Evidence Recovered

From The Vehicle
“[E]Vidence will not be excluded as

0f the discovery of the evidence. Suppression

some sense
815

unless the illegality

fruit

is

is at least

the but for cause

not justiﬁed unless the challenged evidence

(internal

quotations

t0 suppress evidence allegedly gained

marks

omitted).

“Where

a

defendant

initial

burden of showing a factual nexus between the

acquisition of the evidence.”

has

moved

through unconstitutional police conduct, the State bears the

ultimate burden 0f persuasion t0 prove that the challenged evidence

defendant bears an

in

468 U.S. 796,

the product of illegal governmental activity.” Segura V. United States,

(1984)

is

State V. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 546,

is

untainted, but the

illegality

and the

400 P.3d 629, 634

State’s

(Ct.

App.

2017). “This requires a prima facie showing that the evidence sought t0 be suppressed would not

have come

t0 light but for the

government’s unconstitutional conduct.” Li The defendant must
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“show
result

that,

on the events

of the unlawful police conduct.”

Howard has never
seized.

Li.

argued, What

is

obviously

Rather, he has argued only that he

“unconstitutionally detained Mr.

5, 2018.”).)

But

it

(E R.,

Howard When he
was

false, that the vehicle itself

was unlawﬁllly

was unlawfully seized When Trooper Green did not

permit him to walk away from the trafﬁc stop.

December

0f the evidence was a product 0r

that did take place, the discovery

p.

refused t0

30 (claiming that Trooper Green

let

him

leave the parked vehicle on

the detention 0f the vehicle, not

Howard,

that led to the

discovery of the evidence in the vehicle; Howard’s detention had nothing to do with
events that did take place, the discovery 0f the evidence in the car

On

it.

the

was not a product of Howard’s

detention.

Ofﬁcers observed marijuana in the vehicle only ﬁve minutes
(EX.

1,

3:58, 8:44; Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-19.5)

At

that point, they

for contraband, including all containers therein,

State V.

Munoz, 149 Idaho

vehicle While

the

Geo was

Howard was

had probable cause

detained.

to search the car

Which they could d0 Without a warrant.

121, 128, 233 P.3d 52, 59 (2010) (“Viewing the interior 0f a

standing outside 0f

Amendment. Once

after

the ofﬁcers

it

is

motor

not a search Within the meaning of the Fourth

had probable cause

marijuana, they could enter the

m

Geo

to believe that the item

t0 seize it.” (internal citations omitted»;

Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 516-17, 415 P.3d 381, 384-85

(Ct.

m

on the ﬂoorboard of

App. 2015) (“When ofﬁcers

observe contraband in plain View inside a vehicle, they are justiﬁed under the automobile
exception in searching the vehicle for additional contraband, as long as the scope of the search

5

Howard never argued below

that the observation

constituted an illegal search, or that ofﬁcers in any

is

of the marijuana from outside the car

way

acted improperly in Viewing the

marijuana through the passenger Window, 0r that the ofﬁcers could not conduct a search of the
vehicle based on their observation 0f the marijuana.
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limited to only those places Where such contraband might reasonably be found”); State V. Daily,

164 Idaho 366, 369-70, 429 P.3d 1242, 1245-46

(Ct.

App. 2018) (holding

that

where ofﬁcer

observed an open container in plain View in automobile, he was entitled t0 search the rest 0f the

car,

including the glove compartment, for additional open containers);

526 U.S. 295, 301-07 (1999) (holding

that

Wyoming

where ofﬁcers have probable cause

V.

Houghton,

to believe that a

vehicle contains contraband, they have probable cause t0 search the entire car, including

As

passenger’s bags).

the state argued below, the observation of the marijuana “occurred

independent and separate from any detention 0f the Defendant, and thus even
illegal, the

evidence would not be subject t0 suppression.”

(R., p. 67.)

if his detention

was

Neither the ofﬁcers”

observation 0f the marijuana nor the subsequent search were the products 0f Howard’s detention.

Had Howard been

permitted to walk

away from

the car, as he initially began to do and as he

argues he was entitled t0 do, ofﬁcers would have discovered the evidence in the vehicle exactly

as they did.

Even

if his detention

found in the vehicle.

E

was unlawful, he

is

not entitled to suppression of the evidence

State V. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.3d 536,

540

(Ct.

App.

2005) (holding that allegedly unlawful detention did not warrant suppression of evidence found
in search

0f car Where ofﬁcers independently had probable cause t0 search the car based 0n

contraband in plain View).
Indeed,

Howard conceded below

and methamphetamine pipe

that the discovery

in the vehicle

was not

0f the marijuana, methamphetamine,

the product 0f his detention and that the

ofﬁcers would have recovered that evidence even if he had been permitted t0 walk away.

only time

Howard addressed

the relationship

between

his allegedly unlawful detention

evidence gathered by the ofﬁcers, Howard’s attorney stated:

17

The

and the

Obviously,

he had been able t0 leave the scene, the State would be Without the

if

him after he was arrested [presumably, the
The
State
would
continue
t0
have
the items that were located within the
scale].
car. But Without having him there and the things that are in his pockets, then the
State’s really left with a young lady Who takes off from the scene, never says that
the stuff belonged to my client, and is driving a car that belongs t0 another person.
items that were eventually located 0n

Sounds

like

it

was a male.

Howard acknowledged

(TL, p. 34, Ls. 7-17 (paragraph break excluded and emphasis added).)
that the evidence in the vehicle

there

is

no basis
That

is

the product 0f his detention.

follows immediately that

by Howard’s attorney

trouble connecting the evidence found in the vehicle to

t0 leave.

(TL, p. 34, Ls. 7-17.) Whether

it is

Whether that evidence should be suppressed. Evidence
conduct because

it

is

was seized by means 0f

Howard

that the state

if

Howard had

easy 0r difﬁcult t0 support a charge

0f possession by means of the evidence located in the backpack

illegal police

It

t0 suppress that evidence.

so notwithstanding the apparent suggestion

would have had
been permitted

was not

is

irrelevant to the question

suppressible

When

it is

that conduct, State V.

the “fruit” of

Cohagan, 162

Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017) (“Evidence obtained in Violation of the Fourth

Amendment

is

excluded from

Which requires unlawﬁllly seized evidence

subject to the exclusionary rule,

trial.”),

not

When

it is

to

be

lawfully seized but, according to the defendant, might be

difﬁcult t0 use t0 establish the defendant’s guilt.

The

district court therefore

erroneously concluded that the evidence recovered from the

backpack should be suppressed because “there has been n0 evidence

that

contained any contents that were identifying attributable to the defendant.”

(Tr., p. 58, Ls.

(verbatim).)

Whether the backpack contained Howard’s

irrelevant to the question

question whether

it

Whether

it

driver’s license, for instance,

was seized unlawfully, and so

should be suppressed.

Nor
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such backpack

is

is

20-25
simply

simply irrelevant to the

did the district court address in any

way

the

marijuana located in the vehicle after ofﬁcers observed

window. Nevertheless, the
motion

t0 suppress

vehicle.

(R., p.

Trooper Green

It

was

in plain

View through the passenger

extremely broadly worded order granting Howard’s

was presumably intended

74 (ordering
is

district court’s

it

t0 apply t0 all

of the evidence recovered from the

that “evidence gathered against the defendant after

suppressed, including but not limited to the backpack located in the vehicle”).)

error t0 exclude the physical evidence

found in the vehicle in

concession that the seizure 0f the evidence was not the product of any

Even

D.

If

he was seized by

light

of Howard’s

illegality.

The Physical Evidence Located In The Vehicle Had Been Seized As A Product
Illegalitv, It Would Have Been Found In An Inventory Search Of The Vehicle

Of Police
The
the

inevitable discovery doctrine

evidence was

establishes

makes suppression 0f evidence improper Where, even

obtained by constitutionally improper means,

actually

the

if

prosecution

by a preponderance of proof that the evidence inevitably would have been found by

lawful means. Nix V. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart V. State, 136 Idaho 490, 49798, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001).

The underlying

should leave the prosecution in the same position
misconduct, not a worse one.

57 P.3d 807, 813

The

state

(Ct.

that,

in a

to

tow

at

that suppression

would have been absent

442-44; State

even

if ofﬁcers

and the automobile exception

searched the vehicle t0 inventory

had

467 U.S.

it

is

V.

the police

Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102,

App. 2002).

argued below

t0 probable cause

N_iX,

rationale of this rule

this vehicle

its

had not already searched the vehicle pursuant

t0 the warrant requirement, they

contents before having

it

towed. (R.,

p.

would have

67 (“Trooper Green

because the driver was arrested 0n a warrant and the vehicle was parked

random person’s driveway. An inventory 0f

revealed this evidence.”).)

the vehicle prior t0

tow would

also

have

“Inventory searches are a well-recognized exception to the warrant

19

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

742

(Ct.

State V. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870,

App. 2012). “The legitimate purposes 0f inventory searches

property While

owner’s

are: (1) protect the

remains in police custody; (2) protect the State against false claims of

it

stolen property;

276 P.3d 740,

and

(3) protect police

from potential danger.”

Li. (citing

10st or

South Dakota

V.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1976)). Inventory searches 0f automobiles regularly occur
before the vehicle

towed or

tow truck arrived

(before

Sm_ith,

is

transported.

E, gg, Steiart,

152 Idaho

at 869,

the ofﬁcer performed an inventory search of the vehicle);

120 Idaho 77, 80-81, 813 P.2d 888, 891-92 (1991) (under Idaho law

the police t0 search the defendant’s car once the decision

m,

m
m

276 P.3d

was made

it

741

was permissible
impound);

to

at

for

138 Idaho 791, 795, 69 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2003) (“After conducting an inventory search

0f [arrested defendant’s] vehicle, [the ofﬁcer] returned to the patrol car and asked [arrested
defendant]

who he would like

t0

tow

his vehicle.”).

The vehicle pulled over by Trooper Green was not owned by

either the driver or

Howard.

(TL, p. 29, Ls. 3-7.) Trooper Green additionally had no reason t0 believe that the vehicle
a location

it

was lawﬁllly

entitled t0 be.

out 0f the vehicle, and about

Why

she

The

was

driver

had already

lied to ofﬁcers about not

in the area, claiming that a

was

coming

house she was near

belonged t0 her aunt, though the door was locked, the aunt was not home, and she did not
the address.

(EX.

1,

06:26 — 08:03;

Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-22.)

When Howard was

driver pulled into that driveway, he responded that he “wasn’t too sure.” (EX.

6

in

1,

asked

know

Why

the

13:54 — 14:02.6)

Though this portion 0f the dash-cam Video was apparently not Viewed by the district court, the
owner of the driveway in Which the vehicle was parked later told ofﬁcers that neither Howard nor
the driver lived there. (EX.

1,

01:12:10

—

01:13:15.)
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Trooper Green testiﬁed that the vehicle was in

fact

towed and

that

he would have conducted an

inventory search 0f the vehicle if a search had not already been conducted.

16.)

Howard presented no evidence

to the contrary, did not argue that

have been improper, and did not in any way address the argument

been discovered in an inventory search. Even

was somehow

the product of

if the

(TL, p. 21, Ls. 11

—

an inventory search would

that these items

would have

search of the vehicle that already occurred

Howard’s detention, the preponderance of the evidence

that the evidence located in the vehicle, including in the backpack,

would

establishes

inevitably have been

discovered in an inventory search before the vehicle was towed. That evidence should therefore
not have been suppressed.

E.

Found On Howard’s Person Should Not Have Been Suppressed Because It
Was Discovered In A Search Incident T0 A Lawful Arrest Based On Probable Cause That
Howard Concedes Was Independent Of His Allegedly Unlawful Detention
The

The

Scale

state

argued below

incident t0 lawﬁJI arrest that

that,

was justiﬁed by probable cause independent 0f any

scale should not be suppressed.

facts

because the scale was found on Howard’s person in a search

(R., pp. 66-67.)

of this case are relevantly like State

V.

With respect

t0 the discovery

illegality, the

0f the

scale, the

Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004).

ofﬁcers discovered that the defendant, Page, had an outstanding warrant after detaining

ask him questions as he was walking late

at night.

Li. at

842-43, 103 P.3d

then arrested on that warrant and, in a search incident t0

drug paraphernalia.

was unlawful.

Li.

Li.

Page moved

arrest,

at

There,

him

t0

455-56. Page was

ofﬁcers discovered drugs and

t0 suppress that evidence, arguing that the initial seizure

The Idaho Supreme Court agreed

that that initial seizure

was unlawful, but

determined that the evidence seized in the search incident to arrest should not be suppressed

because ofﬁcers had acquired “independent probable cause” to arrest Page, justifying both the
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arrest

and the search incident

unlawful seizure. Li.
there

to

Which

arrest,

“dissipat[ed] the taint” associated with the

According to the Court,

845-47, 103 P.3d at 458-61.

at

was a minimal

lapse of time between the seizure

.

.

.

and the search pursuant

The police ofﬁcer’s conduct was

to a valid arrest warrant.

certainly not ﬂagrant,

nor was his purpose improper. Clearly, once the ofﬁcer discovered that there was

an outstanding warrant, an intervening event under [U.S. v.] Green[, 111 F.3d 5 15
(7th Cir. 1997)], he did not have to release Page and was justiﬁed in arresting him
at that point.

Once he had

was

effectuated a lawful arrest, he

clearly justiﬁed in

conducting a search incident t0 that arrest for the purpose 0f ofﬁcer 0r public
or

safety

prevent

to

California,

concealment

or

of evidence. Chime]

destruction

395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Therefore,

not unlawful for the ofﬁcer to seize the drugs discovered incident t0 that

Li. at 846-47,

103 P.3d

Precisely the

at

same

detained

L. 2.)

Howard was

Howard

was

arrest.

459-60.

is

true here.

Though

there

between Howard’s detention and the search incident
detaining

it

v.

was a

to arrest,

not ﬂagrant or for an improper purpose.

for his safety while

relatively brief period of time

he attempted to locate the

Trooper Green’s conduct in

Trooper Green testiﬁed that he
driver.

(Tr., p. 14, L.

22 —

p. 15,

There was n0 contrary evidence and the circumstances clearly justiﬁed Trooper Green’s

concern about his

safety.

It

was only ﬁve minutes

observed marijuana in the car (EX.
basis to detain

ﬁnding drugs

Howard,

in the car,

ﬂ

1,

Howard was

detained that an ofﬁcer

03:58, 08:44), providing an independent and unchallenged

James, 148 Idaho

had probable cause

for an improper purpose for

after

at 578,

225 P.3d

t0 arrest all

at

1173 (“Deputy Sterling, upon

of the occupants”).

It

was not ﬂagrant 0r

Trooper Green to detain Howard during those ﬁve minutes while he

attempted t0 locate the driver of the vehicle, control the scene, and protect himself and other
ofﬁcers.

The

search

of the

vehicle

that

recovered

marijuana,

methamphetamine,

methamphetamine pipe was justiﬁed by the observation of marijuana
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in the vehicle,

and

a

and had

nothing

at all to

do with Howard’s allegedly unlawful detention.

Having searched the vehicle

and discovered marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia, Trooper Green believed
he had probable cause t0 arrest Howard.

(T12, p. 18, Ls. 12-21.)

Howard never argued below

that

E m,

148

Trooper Green was mistaken and did not have probable cause t0
Idaho

was

at

him.

578, 225 P.3d at 1173. Thus, Trooper Green had probable cause t0

entirely independent

arrest,

arrest

0f Howard’s alleged unlawful detention.

he discovered the scale in Howard’s pocket. (TL,

p. 18, L.

not argued that the search incident to arrest was in any

way

make an

arrest that

In a search incident t0 that

22 —

Howard has

p. 19, L. 1.)

improper.

Again, Howard’s only

argument below was that he was unlawfully detained When Trooper Green did not permit him

walk away from the trafﬁc

Howard when he

When

refused to

stop.

let

(m R.,

him

p.

30 (“The ofﬁcer unconstitutionally detained Mr.

leave the parked vehicle 0n

Trooper Green acquired probable cause t0

was Wholly unrelated
justiﬁed in arresting

t0

him

Howard’s

Egg, 140 Idaho

resulting lawﬁJI search recovered the scale.

“Therefore,

seize the [scale] discovered incident t0 that arrest.”

F.

December

arrest

5, 2018.”).)

Howard, Which probable cause

detention, “he did not have t0 release

at that point.”

t0

at

it

[Howard] and was

846-47, 103 P.3d

was not unlawful

Egg, 140 Idaho

at 847,

at

459-60.

The

for the ofﬁcer t0

103 P.3d

at

460.

T0 The Extent That It Suppressed Any Statements,
Observations, Or Physical Evidence Other Than The Methamphetamine And
Paraphernalia Found In The Vehicle, Or The Scale Found On Howard’s Person
The

District

Court

The defendant has
suppress.

m

State V.

Erred

the burden of identifying With speciﬁcity the evidence he

is

seeking t0

Hudson, 133 Idaho 543, 545, 989 P.2d 285, 287 (1999) (holding

defendant failed t0 identify with speciﬁcity the evidence that should be suppressed).

It is

that

only by

doing so that he can possibly meet his burden t0 show that that evidence was the product of
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police illegality,

400 P.3d

Which

a necessary prerequisite to suppression.

is

634 (holding

at

Likewise,

it is

only

challenged evidence

is

untainted.”

What evidence the defendant
position 0f guessing

defendant including

is

Li.

statements

0f the defendant during and
(R., p. 28.)

and the State’s acquisition of the

The

state

should not be put in the position 0f guessing

district court

“any and

made by

all

determined to suppress.

evidence gathered against the above

the defendant, the observations

after they detained

p. 35, L. 1.)

But he never identiﬁed any statements 0r observations

Howard

Nor

55, L. 2

—

p.

60, L. 4.)

purporting t0 exclude

Green

.

.

.

,

The

all

the ofﬁcers

that should

be

ever identiﬁed was the scale located 0n

in the vehicle.

(TL, p.

did the district court ever identify any statement, observations, or

physical evidence that might have been suppressed other than that

p.

made by

named

him, and any evidence seized subsequent to his

and the marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug pipe located

—

34, L. 11

initial

“ultimate burden of persuasion t0 prove that the

its

suppressed, and the only physical evidence that

his person,

an

546,

seeking t0 suppress, nor should appellate courts be put in the

to suppress

all

illegality

at

he identiﬁes the evidence t0 be suppressed With speciﬁcity

what evidence the

Howard moved

detention.”

if

an attempt to meet

that the state can

162 Idaho

that “the defendant [seeking to suppress evidence] bears

burden of showing a factual nexus between the
evidence.”).

E M,

same physical evidence. (TL,

Nevertheless, the district court’s order

is

exceptionally broad,

“evidence gathered against the defendant after he was seized by Trooper

including but not limited t0 the backpack located in the vehicle.” (R., p. 74.)

district court erred in

suppressing the marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug pipe

found in the vehicle, as well as the scale found in Howard’s pocket.

But

t0 the extent that

purported to suppress any statements 0r observations, 0r any other physical evidence,
again and separately.

Howard

it

it

erred

did not meet his burden to establish a factual nexus between his
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alleged unlawful detention and any such evidence Without so

much

as identifying the evidence.

For the same reason, he has not carried his burden to establish he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that unidentiﬁed evidence.

(Ct.

App. 2004) (“The burden

is

State V. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 739, 85 P.3d 1135, 1138

0n the defendant

prove the existence of a legitimate

t0

expectation of privacy” in evidence he seeks t0 suppress).

required t0 guess as to the evidence

To

Howard meant

Nor should

the state have been

t0 exclude.

the extent that the district court intended t0 suppress

Howard’s

identity,

doing so

is

also contrary t0 the principle that the “identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil

proceeding

is

an unlawful

never

itself suppressible as a fruit

arrest, search,

1039 (1984);

ﬂ

also United States V.

arrest, refusing t0 suppress).

name and

seized and placed in the police car.

78 (1980) (Powell,

J.,

if

it is

conceded

that

concurring) (White,

identity

Cir.

were known only as a

1994)

result

of

Likewise, Trooper Green’s observations 0f Howard’s

J.,

Howard

at the

suppression hearing (TL, p. 13,

Green observed Howard’s appearance before

12-24), cannot be suppressed as Trooper

Howard was

even

Guzman—Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421-22 (9th

appearance, which Trooper Green used to identify

Ls.

arrest,

or interrogation occurred.” I.N.S. V. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,

(though there was n0 dispute that defendant’s

an unlawful

of an unlawﬁll

E

United States

V.

Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 477-

concurring) (a majority of the court holding that a

defendant’s “face” cannot be suppressed, preventing an in-court identiﬁcation, notwithstanding

the fact that the defendant

Again,

Howard does

would not be

in custody t0

be identiﬁed absent unlawful

arrest).

not contend that the trafﬁc stop itself was unlawful.

Finally, the taint

of any

illegality associated

With the very brief detention 0f

Howard

before ofﬁcers observed marijuana in the vehicle, Which provided an independent basis t0 detain

him, was sufﬁciently purged by that observation t0 permit the admission of any observations by
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the ofﬁcers 0r any statements

by Howard made

thereafter.

“The attenuation doctrine—whether

the causal chain has been sufﬁciently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful

conduct—

has been used t0 support the admission of evidence, including for example, voluntary confessions

Egg, 140 Idaho

obtained after unlawful arrests.”

at

846, 103 P.3d at 459.

There are three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful
conduct has been adequately attenuated.

The

factors are: (1) the elapsed time

between the misconduct and the acquisition 0f the evidence, (2) the occurrence of
intervening circumstances, and (3) the ﬂagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action.
Li. (internal citations omitted).

As

discussed above, while the lapse of time between Howard’s

detention and whatever “observations” or “statements” the district court might have intended t0

suppress

may have been

brief,

the observation of marijuana in the vehicle constituted an

intervening circumstance providing an independent basis to detain and arrest Howard, and

Trooper Green’s

initial

detention of

Howard was

not for a ﬂagrant 0r improper purpose, but t0

further legitimate safety concerns.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests

Howard’s motion

t0 suppress

DATED this

this

Court reverse the

district court’s

and remand for further proceedings.

11th day of October, 2019.
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ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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